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WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
it be to place the surety on guard that if in taking the required
oath he has sworn falsely he is subject to prosecution under
the criminal laws of this state."15 (Italics supplied.) This state-
ment is in agreement with the writer's belief that such provi-
sions should be disregarded, at least in statutes enacted before
the Criminal Code of 1942, and that the offense should be gov-
erned by the appropriate articles of that code.1- If this were
done, the offender's false non-judicial oath in the Conforto case
should have been prosecuted as False Swearing rather than as
Perjury. However, in State v. Smith" with Chief Justice O'Niell
writing the court's opinion, it was held that such special penal
provisions were not impliedly repealed by the inconsistent gen-
eral definitions of offenses in the criminal code. Apparently this
view was tacitly reaffirmed by the majority of the court when




After an indictment has been found or an information filed,
the granting of a preliminary examination is "wholly within
the discretion of the district court, and not subject to review
by any other court."' In such cases the grand jury's delibera-
tions, or the district attorney's investigations, insure good faith
and probable cause. Of course the preliminary examination may
be granted for the purpose of fixing bail, taking depositions of
witnesses who may be unavailable at the time of the trial, or
bonding key witnesses to appear. In State v. Gaspard2 a defen-
dant had been charged with theft of rice valued at $4,234.91, and
sought a preliminary examination, claiming that the charge was
unfounded and made to extort money from him. In upholding
the refusal to grant a preliminary hearing, the Supreme Court
15. 222 La. 427, 436, 62 So. 2d 630, 634.
16. Arts. 123-128, La. R.S. 1950, 14:123-128. For a complete discussion
of this point see The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1944-
1945 Term, 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 647 (1946).
17. 207 La. 735, 21 So. 2d 890 (1945).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Art. 154, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950, 15:154.
2. 222 La. 222, 62 So. 2d 281 (1952).
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stressed the trial judge's per curiam statement: "I was con-
vinced that there was at least a reasonably sound basis in law
and fact for the charge, that the charge was not maliciously
filed, that the filing of such charge did not arise out of a 'vicious
conspiracy to deprive respondent of his civil rights' or to 'extort
money from him,' . . . . that no useful purpose could be served
by such a hearing." Actually there was little reason to probe
the sufficiency of the charge, for it is generally conceded that
the existence of probable cause for trying the accused has been
officially determined prior to the filing of the information. After
the charge is filed that matter should not be subject to collateral
inquiry.
PRESCRIPTION
The one year prescriptive period, which serves as a bar to
prosecution for all but a few aggravated felonies, may be inter-
rupted by the filing of an information or finding of an indict-
ment.4 In State v. Murray5 the first information charged theft
of $63.89. After that charge was nolle prosequied, a substi-
tuted information was immediately filed charging theft of
$47.94, and with a slight variation in the date of the alleged
crime. Defense counsel claimed that the first indictment had
not interrupted prescription as to the theft charged in the sub-
stituted information, relying principally upon the variation in
the amount of the thefts charged. In overruling the defendant's
claim of prescription, the Supreme Court looked to the sub-
stance of the two informations and refused to require technically
identical charges. Justice McCaleb stated, "We think it is clear
that the second bill of information is founded on the identical
act charged in the first. There was but one theft, i.e. that of
the money collected by appellee for his employer from the
four customers."6  (Italics supplied.)
Of equal significance was the court's dictum statement con-
cerning the three year prescriptive period, which requires the
nolle prosequiing of a charge if the accused is not brought to
trial within three years." Defense counsel had suggested that
a district attorney might keep a charge hanging over the de-
3. 222 La. 222, 227, 62 So. 2d 281, 282.
4. Art. 8, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950, 15:8.
5. 222 La. 950, 64 So. 2d 230 (1953).
6. 222 La. 950, 955, 64 So. 2d 230, 232.
7. Arts. 8, 9, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950, 15:8, 9.
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fendant indefinitely by the simple expedient of filing a new
information each year. Justice McCaleb was not impressed with
this argument, pointing out that there had been no cases of
such abuse. He further stated that such a practice would be
rendered impossible by the three year prescriptive 'period, which
he construed to require that the accused be brought to trial
"within three years from the date of the original charge." This
is apparently the first judicial statement in regard to this ques-
tion, but its logic and practicality commend it for direct re-
affirmation if such an abuse of the district attorney's powers
should occur.
VENUE
Improper venue may be raised by either a motion to quash
or by a plea to the jurisdiction of the trial court (using
jurisdiction in a broad sense to cover venue between parishes).
In State v. Gaspard8 the court upheld the venue of Jefferson
Davis Parish for the crime of theft, committed by obtaining a
consignment of rice by false pretenses. The false representation
was made in that parish, which was also the place where the
rice was obtained when it was loaded on the truck of an inde-
pendent carrier hired by the accused. It made no difference that
final delivery by the truck was made at defendant's place of
business in Vermilion Parish. According to the trial judge's per
curiam, "all elements of the offense charged, including the de-
livery or obtaining of the property ... occurred or were com-
mitted in the Parish of Jefferson Davis."9 It is of interest to note
that if the trucker had been an employee of the victim, and
hence delivery to the owner had been at his place of business
in Vermilion Parish, the offense could have been tried in either
parish. The making of the false pretense and the obtaining of
the goods would both be substantial elements of the crime, and
thus a basis for trial venue under the liberal provisions of
Article 13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as amended in
1942.10
8. 222 La. 222, 62 So. 2d 281 (1952).
9. 222 La. 222, 228, 62 So. 2d 281, 283.
10. La. Act 147 of 1942, La. R.S. 1950, 15:13. Cf. State v. Pollard, 215 La.
655, 41 So. 2d 465 (1949), discussed in 10 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 207 (1950)





State v. Laurence" applied the rather obvious principle that
the validity and nature of a charge is determined from "the body
of the indictment" and that an otherwise proper indictment is
not invalidated by an incorrect endorsement on its back by the
deputy clerk.
In State v. Scott1 2 defense counsel had raised the technical
objection that since the short form indictment for murder was
couched in language pertaining to a charge against a single
defendant, it could not be employed in charging a murder by
two defendants. This objection was briefly and definitely over-
ruled. Clearly no such restriction was intended by the illustra-
tive language employed.
In State v. Roshto"3 the Supreme Court upheld a short form
indictment for cattle theft, which had been drawn in conformity
with Article 235.14 In his opinion, Justice LeBlanc relied heavily
on the court's landmark decision in State v. Pete" wherein the
validity of the short form for the general crime of theft was
unanimously sustained.
BILL OF PARTICULARS
The bill of particulars supplements the short form indict-
ment by providing full information as to the details of the
charge, and the trial judge must be liberal in the granting of
a motion for a bill of particulars where the short form is em-
ployed. In State v. Holmes16 the defendant had been charged,
in a short form indictment, with simple burglary of a specified
service station. The Supreme Court held that he was entitled
to a bill of particulars informing him as to whether the alleged
intent of the accused had been to commit a theft or a forcible
felony in the building entered, and if forcible felony, the nature
of such intended felony. In holding that the accused was entitled
to these particulars the court pointed out that such a specifica-
tion would have been essential to its validity if a long form
indictment had been employed.
11. 221 La. 861, 60 So. 2d 464 (1952).
12. 66 So. 2d 802 (La. 1953).
13. 222 La. 185, 62 So. 2d 268 (1952).
14. Art. 235, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950, 15:235. See
Comment, 6 Louisiana Law Review 78 (1944).
15. 206 La. 1078, 20 So. 2d 368 (1944).
16. State v. Brooks, 173 La. 9, 136 So. 71 (1931).
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The bill of particulars is not a part of the indictment."
Thus, the Supreme Court held, in State v. Hudson,' that it is
unnecessary to amend the indictment so as to include the infor-
mation furnished in a bill of particulars.
Certain limitations upon the extent and the nature of infor-
mation which may be procured through a bill of particulars
have become fairly well established by the jurisprudence. 19
Thus in State v. Matassa20 the Supreme Court upheld the trial
judge's overruling of defense counsel's motion wherein he was
seeking information as to the particular type of heroin which
the defendant had allegedly dealt in. It had not been shown
how such detailed information was material to the defense.
Furthermore, the state cannot be expected to furnish informa-
tion which it does not have, and experts had testified as to the
difficulty of ascertaining the specific sources and types of heroin.
A more difficult issue was presented by the refusal to grant
requested particulars as to whether defendants had committed
the crimes individually and directly, or were liable as accesso-
ries before the fact. In holding that this evidence was properly
refused, Justice Hamiter declared, "The request related to evi-
dence to be used in proof of the offenses charged, and the state
was not required to furnish it before trial."'2 1 Such a ruling might
appear a bit abrupt but for the fact that the distinction between
principals and accessories after the fact has been abolished in
Louisiana.22 Even then, the question presented was a close one.
LUNACY PROCEEDINGS
Substantial clarification of the proper procedures for hand-
ling the report of a lunacy commission has resulted from two
1952 decisions. In State v. Winfield23 there had been some delay
in submission of the written report of the lunacy commission.
To expedite matters the trial judge telephoned one of the mem-
bers who informed him that the written report was to the effect
that the defendant was presently sane and able to assist in his
defense. Thereupon the trial judge held the lunacy hearing and
adjudged the defendant presently sane. The holding of the hear-
17. State v. Bienvenu, 207 La. 859, 22 So. 2d 196 (1945).
18. 222 La. 14, 62 So. 2d 85 (1952).
19. Comment, 12 Louisiana Law Review 457 (1952).
20. 222 La. 363, 62 So. 2d 609 (1952).
21. 222 La. 363, 370, 62 So. 2d 609, 611.
22. Art. 24, La. Crim. Code of 1942; La. R.S. 1950, 14:24.
23. 222 La. 157, 62 So. 2d 258 (1952).
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ing in advance of the actual filing of a written lunacy report was
held to be reversible error. At first blush this would seem like
an unduly technical application of the requirement that a written
copy of the lunacy commission's report must be furnished to
the trial judge.24 However, the underlying basis of the decision
clearly appears in Justice Moise's statement that "The manda-
tory provisions of the statute-that the written report of the
commission shall be presented to the trial judge and shall be
accessible to the district attorney and to the attorney for the
accused-were not followed." These requirements were "for the
benefit of both the prosecution and the defense-because it is
provided that at such hearing of the lunacy commission-both
the prosecution and the defense are granted the right to offer
other evidence and summon witnesses. '25 It thus appears that
the unavailability of the report to the accused, rather than its
mere oral form, was the basis of the reversal.
In State v. Solomon26 the Supreme Court upheld a sanity
hearing where only the coroner had testified, pointing out that
it is not essential that members of the lunacy commission testify
at the hearing-unless their findings are questioned or defense
counsel requests that they be present. There was no finding of
any such request in the instant case.
Justice McCaleb's opinion in State v. Swails27 provides an
excellent review of the criterion for determining the issue of
present insanity as a bar to trial for a crime. The test set out
in Article 267 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is addressed
entirely to the present mental condition of the accused. Is he
now of sufficient mental capacity "to understand the proceed-
ings and to assist in his defense"? If he is, a past condition of
mental derangement, or the probability that he may become
mentally incompetent at some future date, should not consti-
tute a bar to his presently standing trial for the crime charged.
Ordinarily amnesia or a memory lapse for the period of a year
preceding the crime would prevent the accused from being
capable of properly assisting in his defense. However, this was
not true in the Swails case where the defendant was not seeking
to deny or justify the killing. There he was defending solely
upon the ground of insanity at the time of the crime, and the
24. Art. 269, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950, 15:269.
25. 222 La. 157, 161, 62 So. 2d 258, 259 (1952).
26. 222 La. 269, 62 So. 2d 481 (1952).
27. 66 So. 2d 796 (La. 1953).
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alleged amnesia would aid, rather than hamper, the presentation
of such a defense.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
State v. Ysasi28 lays at rest a confusing problem as to the
effect of attacks upon two or more persons arising out of a
common criminal transaction. In State v. Morrison 29 the Su-
preme Court had indicated that two killings arising out of a
single robbery should be treated as a single criminal act and
charged as one murder, even though one victim was killed with
an axe and the other was shot to death. While that holding
could be explained on the ground that the objection to the
combined charge came too late when urged for the first time
during trial, there was language in the opinion which indicated
a distorted construction of the term "act" so as to make it vir-
tually synonymous with a criminal transaction. The question
was squarely presented in the Ysasi case where the defendant
had committed batteries upon two different persons, at the same
time and arising out of the same disturbance. These batteries
had been committed within a few seconds of each other, like
the homicides in the Morrison case, and were provable by the
same witnesses. After studying the entire jurisprudence and
not any individual case standing alone, the court concluded
that two distinct and separate offenses had been committed, and
that two convictions did not violate the constitutional prohi-
bition against double jeopardy.30 The double jeopardy provision
would clearly apply if the defendant were tried twice for a bat-
tery on the same person. It would probably also apply if two
victims had been injured or killed by a single act." However,
it does not apply in a situation like the Ysasi case where there
were two criminal acts and therefore two crimes.
Von DIRE EXAMINATION OF JURORS
Two 1952 decisions serve to re-emphasize the general prin-
ciple that the Supreme Court will not reverse the trial judge's
rulings in connection with the voir dire examination of pros-
pective jurors "Except in plain cases of abuse of discretion. 3 2
28. 222 La. 402, 64 So. 2d 213 (1953), noted infra p. 273.
29. 184 La. 39, 165 So. 323 (1935).
30. La. Const of 1921, Art. I, § 9.
31. State v. Batson, 108 La. 479, 32 So. 478 (1902).




In State v. Matassa3 the trial judge had refused to permit de-
fense counsel, upon voir dire examination of prospective jurors,
to refer to the severe penalty possible for narcotics convictions.
Such reference was made, according to the trial judge's per
curiam, for the purpose of causing the jurors to hesitate to find
the accused guilty. In holding that the reference was properly
disallowed, Justice Hamiter pointed out that the verdict is to
be rendered solely on the basis of evidence adduced at the trial,
and the voir dire examination cannot be utilized as a means for
influencing the jury in advance of trial. In State v. Morris34
the Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's refusal to permit
voir dire examination regarding the juror's willingness to recog-
nize entrapment as a defense. The situation came within the
prohibition of hypothetical questions or questions of law which
call for prejudgment of any suppositional statement of facts.
The tendency of such questioning is to commit the juror in
advance of trial as to his holding on such state of facts. As a
make-weight factor, the questions were further objectionable
as failing to draw correctly the distinction between entrapment
and inducement. Judge Fournet epitomized the basis of these
holdings in quoting the express provision of Article 357 that
"The purpose of the examination of jurors is to ascertain the
qualifications of the juror in the trial of the case in which he
has been tendered, and the examination shall be limited to that
purpose."
OPENING STATEMENT BY THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
Louisiana jurisprudence has tended toward the minority view
that the district attorney's opening statement is for the purpose
of making the state "show its hand" by outlining its proof in
advance of trial.3 5 Although there is some doubt as to how
complete and detailed this statement must be, there is a decided
tendency toward liberality. This attitude is exemplified in State
v. Solomon 36 where the defense had objected to the testimony
of two witnesses, identifying the body of the victim, on the
ground that they had not been mentioned in the opening state-
ment. It was found sufficient that the district attorney had
stated that the body of the deceased "was identified by his
33. Ibid.
34. 222 La. 480, 62 So. 2d 649 (1952).
35. See Note, 3 Louisiana Law Review 238 (1940).
36. 222 La. 269, 62 So. 2d 481 (1952).
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brother Frank Street and others." (Italics supplied.) If the
opening statement is to serve as a limitation on the state's proof,
then such a liberal attitude is almost essential. Better yet, the
Louisiana courts might follow the view that the statement does
not limit the state's proof, but rather is designed only "to enable
the jury to understand and appreciate the testimony as it falls
from the lips of the witnesses.
'37
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
The trial judge's role in the interrogation of witnesses is
illustrated by the case of State v. Coffi J 8 where defense counsel
had objected to the trial judge's interrogation of unintelligent
witnesses, claiming that it amounted to comment on the evi-
dence. In holding the questioning proper, Justice Ponder stated,
"It would appear that the trial judge was endeavoring to clarify
the testimony so that it would be intelligible and he had the
right to interrogate the witnesses sufficiently to know and under-
stand what they said and what they meant, and to shape his
questions so as to clarify their testimony." 39 Evidencing a similar
understanding of the problems of the conscientious trial judge,
the Supreme Court also upheld the refusal to permit apparently
irrelevant testimony. "The trial judge," declared Justice Ponder,
"is vested with sound discretion to stop the prolonged, unneces-
sary and irrelevant examination of witnesses."40
JUDGE'S CHARGE TO THE JURY
The scope and nature of the judge's charge to the jury was
considered in two 1952 decisions. Special defenses or special
rules relied upon by defense counsel are to be covered by special
charges, presented to the judge at the close of the evidence. 41
Such charges must be given if they are "wholly correct and
wholly pertinent, '42 but the charge is not authorized when based
on a special defense unsupported by any evidence. Thus, in
State v. Morris 43 the Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's
refusal of a special entrapment charge where "'there was no
37. State v. Sharbino, 194 La. 709, 716, 194 So. 756, 758 (1940).
38. 222 La. 487, 62 So. 2d 651 (1952).
39. 222 La. 487, 490, 62 So. 2d 651, 652.
40. Ibid.
41. Art. 390, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950, 15:390.
42. Ibid.
43. 222 La. 480, 484, 62 So. 2d 649, 650 (1952).
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evidence introduced . . . in the trial which would warrant such
a charge.'" For a similar reason a special charge on "defense
of habitation" was properly rejected in State v. Rone.44 The trial
judge's per curiam stated that there was no evidence that the
homicide was in defense of habitation, and the Supreme Court
was bound by the trial judge's findings of fact. Review was
further precluded by the fact that this requested charge was
not in writing, thus preventing any appellate determination of
its correctness or applicability.45 In the Rone case other special
charges concerning self-defense and defense of others were re-
fused because they were sufficiently, and less confusingly, cov-
ered in the general charge. This was approved on appeal.
Similarly, in State v. Gray" a series of lengthy special charges
had been refused on the ground that their substance was covered
in the general charge in simple and less confusing language. After
reviewing the general charge, the Supreme Court agreed that
the requested special charges would have served no useful pur-
pose.
The general charge covers only the law relative to the gen-
eral elements of criminal liability. In State v. Morris47 the
Supreme Court held that the law relative to the jury recom-
mendation for a suspended sentence need not be included in the
general charge, being a matter upon which a special charge must
be requested. This point is mentioned merely to indicate the
distinction between the general charge and matters requiring
special charges, for a 1952 amendment of the probation law has
eliminated the requirement of a jury recommendation, thus
placing probation entirely in the discretion of the trial judge.48
VERDICTS
A responsive verdict of a lesser degree of the crime charged
must specify the grade of such offense if it is graded.49 In State
v. Hudson ° a defendant charged with theft was found "guilty
of attempted theft." Defense counsel's motion in arrest was
based, in part, on the claim that the verdict was insufficient
44. 222 La. 99, 62 So. 2d 114 (1952).
45. Article 390 provides that requested special charges shall be submitted
in writing.
46. 221 La. 868, 60 So. 2d 466 (1952).
47. 222 La. 480, 62 So. 2d 649 (1952).
48. La. Act 367 of 1952, amending Art. 530, § 1, La. Code of Crim. Proc.
of 1928. See Louisiana Legislation, 13 Louisiana Law Review .65 (1953).
49. State v. Chambers, 194 La. 1042, 195 So. 532 (1940).
50. 222 La. 13, 62 So. 2d 85 (1952).
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because it did not specify the value of the property the defendant
had attempted to steal. In upholding the verdict, the court
assigned the reason that it had fully complied .with the form
set out in the 1948 responsive verdict statute.5' An additional
reason for the holding lies in the fact that attempted theft, unlike
the basic crime of theft, is not graded according to the value
of the property involved.52
It is the duty of the trial judge to instruct the jury upon
the law applicable to the lesser and responsive verdicts which
may be found under the indictment. 3
In State v. Espinosa54 the Supreme Court affirmed a convic-
tion of obtaining a narcotic drug by a forged prescription. It
was held that the trial judge had not committed reversible error
in refusing to-instruct the jury that it could bring in an attempt
verdict. The court agreed that an attempt to obtain narcotics
was a lesser and included degree of the offense charged, both
by prior jurisprudence 55 and by a specific 1952 amendment of
the Narcotics Act," but justified the refusal of the instruction
concerning attempt as a responsive verdict by the brief state-
ment that "the defendant was charged with obtaining a narcotic,
and his confession which was admitted in evidence states that
he did obtain the drug through forgery. '57  (Italics supplied.)
The full implications of this decision are somewhat difficult to
grasp. Probably it means that the trial judge may omit legally
responsive lesser verdicts where, as in the principal case, the
evidence is such that it could not possibly provide any logical
support for such a verdict. In such cases it could hardly be
claimed that the omission has "probably resulted in a miscar-
riage of justice, is prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
accused, or constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional
or statutory right."58 Looking to the facts of the Espinosa case,
it would appear that no useful purpose, except possibly jury
51. Art. 386, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, as amended by La. Act
161 of 1948.
52. Art. 27, La. Crim. Code of 1942; La. R.S. 1950, 14:27. Note the special
provisions regarding theft in the penalty clause. This variation is based
on the practical consideration that frequently it will be impossible to
determine "how much" a defendant "intended to steal."
53. Art. 386, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950, 15:386.
54. 66 So. 2d 323 (La. 1953).
55. State v. Broadnax, 216 La. 1003, 45 So. 2d 604 (1950).
56. La. R.S. 1950, 40:981, as amended by La. Act 429 of 1952, § 1.
57. Justice Moise, 66 So. 2d 323, 325 (La. 1953).
58. Art. 557, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950, 15:557.
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confusion, would have been served by the requested attempt
instruction. At the same time, the rule apparently applied in
this case should be limited to the clearest cases, for it is the
duty of the jury, rather than the trial judge, to decide whether
the evidence will support lesser and included responsive verdicts.
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL TO SERVE "THE ENDS OF JUSTICE"
State v. Weber59 held that there was no basis for review by
the Supreme Court when a motion for a new trial to serve "the
ends of justice" 60 was denied. In such case the issue is one of
fact and hence not reviewable. Also, this ground gives the trial
judge an apparently limitless and completely discretionary power
to grant a new trial without assigning specific reasons therefor.
A new use of this omnibus clause in Article 509 was sug-
gested by State v. Truax61 where the motion for a new trial came
too late, having been filed the day after sentence and fourteen
days after the verdict. The trial judge's refusal of the motion
was clearly justified by the express provision of Article 505
that the motion for a new trial "must be filed and disposed of
before sentence." However, Justice LeBlanc made the novel
dictum suggestion that a tardy motion for a new trial could
have been granted under the broad provision of Article 509(5),
which authorizes the granting of a new trial "Whenever, though
as a matter of legal right the accused may not be entitled to
one, yet the judge is of the opinion that the ends of justice
would be served by the granting of a new trial." The granting
of a motion on this ground, declared Justice LeBlanc, "is a
matter which addresses itself primarily to the discretion of the
trial court and this court will not interfere unless an arbitrary
abuse of that discretion appears. '62 Justice McCaleb, in his
concurring opinion, disagreed with the suggestion that the trial
judge might grant a tardy motion under ground (5) of Article
509. He points out that Article 509 merely sets forth the grounds
for a new trial if "timely sought," and is limited by the general
requirements set out in Article 505. This appears to be a logical
and natural construction of the interrelation of these two
59. 221 La. 1093, 61 So. 2d 883 (1952).
60. Art. 509(5), La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950, 15:509(5).
61. 222 La. 463, 62 So. 2d 643 (1952).
62. 222 La. 463, 467, 62 So. 2d 643, 644 (1952).
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articles. If motions for a new trial are to be authorized after
sentence, it must be on the circumstances of the special case,63
APPEAL--METHOD OF TAKING
A number of cases applied the general rule that the Supreme
Court will only review a conviction on appeal where there are
bills of exceptions duly taken, filed and perfected, or where
there is an error patent on the face of the record.6 4 In State v.
Darteze5 the Supreme Court approved the trial judge's refusal
to sign bills of exceptions which were tendered for the first
time after the order for an appeal had been signed. Chief Justice
Fournet restated the rule "that after an appeal has been granted
the trial judge is immediately divested of jurisdiction and any
bills filed thereafter and presented to the trial judge for his
signature and per curiam come too late and cannot be considered
on appeal.' 66 (Italics supplied.) It was urged that the trial
judge, in view of defense counsel's multiple commitments de-
manding immediate attention, had granted a "reasonable time"
to prepare and submit the bills of exceptions, that the short
delay was clearly reasonable, and that the effect of the trial
judge's ruling was to deprive the accused of any opportunity
to pursue his appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed this claim
with the terse remark that "The trial judge is without right or
authority to extend the time within which the appeal may be
taken." This holding may be justified under a strict application
of the provision in Article 545 that the trial judge loses juris-
diction over the cause after the appeal is granted. However,
it apparently runs contra to prior Louisiana jurisprudence and
procedures.
In State v. Young 67 the Supreme Court had considered bills
of exceptions which had been signed four days after the appeal
was granted. There, as in the Dartez case, the delayed presen-
tation was pursuant to an agreement whereby the trial judge
and not by a strained construction of Article 509(5).
63. As in State v. George, 218 La. 18, 48 So. 2d 265 (1950), where the
sentence had been imposed without the 24 hour delay or any waiver thereof.
64. State v. Lorello, 222 La. 268, 62 So. 2d 402 (1952), narcotics violator
sentenced to life imprisonment as a multiple offender; State v. Coffil, 222
La. 487, 62 So. 2d 651 (1952); State v. Weber, 221 La. 1093, 61 So. 2d 883
(1952) holding that the bills of exceptions must be predicated upon actual
adverse rulings of the court.
65. 222 La. 9, 62 So. 2d 83 (1952).
66. 222 La. 9, 12, 62 So. 2d 83, 84 (1952).
67. 153 La. 605, 96 So. 275 (1922).
1953] 243
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
allowed ten days for filing of the bills. In view of the practical
importance of the issue, it might be well to re-examine the
court's reasoning in the Young case. In rejecting the district
attorney's argument that bills of exceptions must always be
presented and signed before appeal, Judge Dawkins stated,
"It is unquestionably true that the granting of the appeal
divests the trial court of jurisdiction, in so far as the per-
formance of any act requiring the exercise of judicial dis-
cretion or judgment is concerned; but as to ministerial duties,
which are necessary to have the record show what took
place, we think it has the power, within reasonable bounds
before granting such an appeal, to reserve the right to do
whatever is necessary to accomplish that result. The sign-
ing of a bill of exceptions is so much a ministerial duty that,
when timely applied for, mandamus will lie to compel its
performance. . . Where time is requested before appeal,
the judge is called upon to exercise a sound discretion, and
may refuse or grant it within reasonable limits, not to exceed
the completion and filing of the transcript within the return
day, provided he acts before losing jurisdiction. When this
has been done, nothing remains but to execute the order
or duty which he has imposed upon himself while the case
was still in his hands. '6 8
Justice Dawkins' reasoning is not unanswerable, but the re-
sult is one which commends itself as a very practical solution
of the dilemma of the defense attorney who is faced with a
crowded agenda and actually deserves a little additional time
to perfect his bills of exception. While the writer has not had
the opportunity to research completely the Louisiana juris-
prudence on this point, it appears that the granting of additional
time to perfect bills of exceptions has not been uncommon. For
example, in State v. Allen"' the trial judge granted additional
time for the presentation and filing of bills of exception. Since
the bills were not presented until two days after the date fixed,
they were held to come too late. However, the clear inference
was that they would have been effectively perfected if signed
and filed in the time stipulated.
As the law now stands, in light of the Dartez case, the
attorney must follow the indirect procedure of having the trial
68. 153 La. 605, 614, 96 So. 275, 278.
69. 167 La. 798, 120 So. 372 (1929).
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judge agree not to sign the order of appeal until such future
time as will enable him to have perfected his bills. Surer yet,
he has ten days in which to move for an appeal and so should
delay his motion until the bills of exception are in order.70
Article 542 provides that the motion for appeal shall be made
"within ten judicial days after the rendition of the judgment
complained of"; and further provides for an extension of that
time where the trial judge fails to act upon the bills of excep-
tion tendered for his signature.
The Dartez case also serves to point up the further require-
ment of Article 542 that the order for appeal must be made "in
open court." The court did not pass on that issue, but it may
be assumed that the telephone motion would scarcely -satisfy
the express requirements of the law.
State v. Weaver7 1 applied the simply stated rule that bills
of exception, which were neither argued orally nor briefed on
appeal, are presumed to have been abandoned. This policy
should be consistently followed, for an "off the cuff" opinion
on unbriefed issues frequently beclouds, rather than clarifies
the law.7
2
APPEAL-SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In State v. Matassa7 3 the Supreme Court again affirmed its
previous rulings that the trial judge's overruling of a motion
for a new trial does not present a question for review by that
court if there was any evidence (no matter how little) to support
the conviction.7 4 In that case the defendant had sought a com-
plete transcript of the testimony in order to establish his claim
70. Art. 542, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950, 15:542.
71. 222 La. 148, 62 So. 2d 255 (1952). Accord: State v. Morgan, 66 So.
2d 852 (La. 1953) where the bill of exceptions had not been perfected, and
no appearance was made on appeal.
72. An example of the danger of such holdings is State v. Mitchel, 210
La. 1078, 29 So. 2d 162 (1946) where the Supreme Court considered a double
jeopardy problem despite the apparent abandonment of the appeal by de-
fense counsel. In holding that the defendant, who struck a 16-year old
youth could be prosecuted twice for the act, which happened to fit under
two separate articles of the Criminal Code, the Supreme Court partially
opened the door for a rule which would violate the basic purpose of the
prohibition against double jeopardy. See The Work of the Supreme Court
for the 1947-1948 Term, 8 Louisiana Law Review 290 (1948).
73. 222 La. 363, 62 So. 2d 609, 614 (1952). Accord: State v. Coffil, 222 La.
487, 62 So. 2d 651 (1952).
74. For a discussion of other recent cases in point see, Work of Supreme




"that no evidence of guilt whatever as to him was introduced."
The refusal to order such transcription was held not to consti-
tute reversible error. From this it appears that the opportunity
for review is limited to those exceptional cases where the facts
are stipulated and a pure question of law is involved, 5 or where
the judge's per curiam statement shows the complete lack of
proof of some essential element of the crime.76
REPRmVE VIOLATIONS
In Waggoner v. Cozart77 the court held that where a con-
victed offender had been reprieved by the Governor and had
committed another felony while enjoying his temporary free-
dom, he must consecutively serve both his original sentence and
the sentence for the second offense, and that the judge had no
authority to order the concurrent serving of both sentences.
The court further held that the period of time while the offender
was out of the penitentiary on reprieve could not be considered
as time served on his first sentence. Justice Moise thus re-
affirmed the generally accepted proposition that a sentence of
imprisonment can only be satisfied "'by the actual -suffering of
the imprisonment imposed.' ",78 The same rules would apply,
under express provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 79
to a probationer who committed another crime. One basic dif-
ference is to be noted. A reprieve is always treated as a mere
suspension of sentence, with the result that the full sentence
must be served at the termination of the period of freedom.
However, where a probationer completes the entire period of
his probation without violation of the terms thereof, he is en-
titled to a complete release.
75. State v. Bernard, 204 La. 844, 16 So. 2d 454 (1943).
76. State v. Ginagosso, 157 La. 360, 102 So. 429 (1924).
77. 222 La. 1039, 64 So. 2d 424 (1953).
78. 222 La. 1039, 1047, 64 So. 2d 424, 426 (1953), quoting from 8 R.C.L.
259.
79. Arts. 534, 538, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950, 15:534
and 538.
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